"The Firm as an Incentive System"

by Holmstrom, Bengt; Milgrom, Paul (1994)

Abstract

We explore the twin hypotheses (i) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (ii) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and management of sales forces.

Keywords

Firms, Incentive System, Empirical Study, Economics

Themes

Theory of the Firm

Links to Reference

• http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118041
• https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118041
• https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2118041.pdf

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